Killing in conservation: Lethal control

Animals are often deliberately killed with the aim of conserving threatened species, habitats and ecosystems. It is usually assumed that the ends justify the means and that the costs to life are outweighed by the benefits. Although lethal control measures are common practice in conservation, the ethical issues involved are not often explicitly discussed. This is not to say that these decisions are not based on ethical values, they certainly are, but these decisions are frequently made using implied ethics rather than rigorously examining the ethical issues. This post aims to identify the ethical issues involved in justifying lethal control for conservation purposes. This post is not covering  lethal control for financial gain or other non-conservation motivations (e.g. badger culls or illegal killing of birds of prey by gamekeepers), killing wild animals for conservation research (this will be a future post) or solidly suggesting where lines should be drawn, only identifying the issues which should be considered in lethal control decisions in conservation.

Equal consideration of interests versus effective conservation

The essence of this decision is the balance between the interests of individuals of the “problem species” and the conservation benefit resulting from their removal. The interests of the problem species must be given full and equal consideration and are more straightforward to determine, assuming there is no question of a threat to their conservation. This is an important assumption; the decision is much more complex if there is a possibility that the problem species is also under threat of extinction or could become threatened as a result of control measures. However, as many problem species are detrimental to other species, habitats or ecosystems as a result of their abundance, this is usually a safe assumption. Another assumption is that the problem species is not necessary for the conservation of another species, habitat or ecosystem in the proposed control area. The interests of the problem species are balanced against conservation values – the continued survival of ecosystems and the prevention of biodiversity loss. The value of an ecosystem or habitat is not the same type of value given to the interests of individuals of the problem species and so they can be difficult to weigh against each other – comparing apples and oranges. Even when the conservation interest under threat is a sole species, it is not usually correct to simply compare the interests of individuals of the threatened species with those of individuals of the problem species as the threatened species presumably has an additional conservation value.

Lethal control is not the only option to deal with a conservation threat, many other methods exist, but limited resources for conservation frequently lead to the decision that lethal control is the most efficient and effective option. Once the decision has been made that action must be taken to protect a threatened species, habitat or ecosystem, these financial considerations come into the decision to use lethal control but are not the only factors; several other issues affect the decision on whether lethal control is the most ethical solution.

Factors affecting the weight given to the interests of problem species

Intelligence and awareness

The interests of individuals of problem species largely depend on their level of sentience. This is sometimes considered in generalised terms by considering taxa, but this does not fully represent the ethical issues as species within a taxon may have a wide range of sentience levels. The issues involved in determining the weight given to the interests of a problem species include self-awareness, intelligence, rationality and the ability to view itself as a being existing through time. This topic is discussed by Peter Singer in terms of the ethics of killing animals for any reason, in a chapter entitled “Taking life: Animals” in Practical Ethics (3^rd ed., 2011) and many of the discussions can be applied to lethal control. The key issue is whether or not an animal has an interest in continuing to live. If so, this interest must be considered. All animals have evolved defensive and protective responses to certain threats to their lives but this does not necessarily mean that they view themselves as beings existing through time which wish to continue living. However, studies of several species, including primates, pigs and birds, have found that some species do have the ability to understand themselves as beings which exist over time and so potentially have an interest in continuing to live which will be violated by lethal control. This does not necessarily mean that lethal control cannot be justified but this information affects the weight given to the interests of individuals of the problem species.

 

Native or non-native

Non-native species cause many threats to conservation as they often outcompete or predate native species which have not evolved in their presence and so are unprepared to cope with this sudden new pressure. However, it should be the problem caused rather than the non-native species status alone which contributes to justifying lethal control. But does the native or non-native status of the problem species affect the weight given to the interests of individuals of this species? That is, if a similar problem is caused by a native species and a non-native species, is there more justification for controlling the non-native species than the native species? This justification may take the form of an argument for conserving an ecosystem “as it should be”, as it would have been without this non-native species. Yet ecosystems have been modified to such a degree by humans (the source of the vast majority, if not all, species introductions) that removing a non-native problem species will not result in a return to this utopian, perfect ecosystem, weakening the argument for aiming for this “natural ecosystem”. Also, if a non-native species is beneficial to conservation, such as non-native sycamores in the UK providing good habitats for native birds and invertebrates, the non-native status of the species seems little justification for removing it. Perhaps aiming for new, sustainable ecosystems with the aim of maximising global biodiversity regardless of the geographic origin of species would be a better solution – though this will often, but not necessarily, mean the removal of non-native species. So although non-native species are often problematic, there appears to be little justification for using this status as a factor justifying lethal control – though it is frequently vaguely mentioned as a factor.

 

Source of problem

The previous section mentions that humans are the source of most, if not all, problematic species introductions. Humans are also the cause of many other problems in conservation which may lead to the possibility of using lethal control. Examples include hunting natural predators to extinction or low levels (e.g. unsustainable deer populations resulting from wolves being hunted to extinction in the UK) or destroying habitats such that species, habitats or ecosystems are now threatened with extinction due to factors which were previously not a problem (e.g. the impact of predation on breeding wading birds is now possibly unsustainably high after wader populations have been reduced following massive habitat loss). As humans are the source of these problems, it may be that we have an ethical obligation to resolve them which could reduce the weight given to the interests of individuals of the problem species. (In the case of humans causing the extinction of natural predators, it could be argued that lethal control of the now problematic prey species is justified as humans are theoretically taking the place of the predators. However, the effects of killing by humans are likely to be very different to the effects of killing by natural predators unless efforts are made to kill the individuals which would be most likely to be taken by natural predators, e.g. the slowest and weakest animals. When the species being controlled is also considered to be a game animal, for example deer in the UK and the “Big Five game” in Africa, the issues are also clouded by financial and political motivations.)

Factors affecting the weight given to the threatened conservation interest

Species, habitats and ecosystems can be considered to have a variable conservation value which is given a variable weight – with the product of these two factors to be compared with the considerations of the problem species discussed above. What determines the value of a species, habitat or ecosystem and what determines the weight given to this value? 

Certain elements concerning the value of a species, habitat or ecosystem are constant across all conservation interests. These include existence value - the idea that a species should be allowed to continue to exist and evolve without being destroyed by humans (discussed in my previous post) - and heritage value – that species, habitats and ecosystems should be conserved for future generations. These values are particularly subjective. In addition to these values, other elements concerning the value of a species can be variable and generally concern their ecology. One such element is the contribution of a species to ecosystem functioning (an ecosystem function is a useful process carried out by biota, such as nutrient cycling), e.g. a keystone species, vital for the maintenance of ecosystem functioning, may be assigned a greater value than a species considered redundant as it only contributes an ecosystem function also performed by many other species. Other elements adding variable values could include spiritual and aesthetic values and ecosystem services (ecosystem functions which benefit humans, such as crop pollination) – though while these are not strictly conservation values as they are for human benefit, they are factors which are considered.

Let us assume that biodiversity has a very high value and the extinction of any species is a great evil to be avoided. The next stage is considering how great a weight to assign this value. The level of extinction risk is the main factor influencing the weight given to these conservation interests when making a decision regarding lethal control – simply that the greater the risk of extinction, the greater the weight given to the conservation value of this species. When considering the conservation value and weight given to a habitat or ecosystem, the combined conservation values of and extinction risks posed by the loss of the habitat or ecosystem to multiple species can be used. The other important factor in assigning a weight to conservation value is the size of the expected benefit – if only a small advance against extinction risk is made then the weight given to the conservation interest is reduced and vice versa. (The level of certainty that lethal control will result in this benefit is discussed below.)

Factors affecting the decision to use lethal control

If it is decided that the benefit to conservation outweighs the interests of the problem species, what affects the decision to use lethal control over non-lethal methods? (Financial considerations are one factor, but the ethics of conservation funding is outwith the scope of this post.)

 

Imbalance between interests of problem species and conservation interest

If the degree of difference between the interests of the problem species and the conservation interest is very slight, then this difference does not seem to be enough to violate the interests of the problem species. How great does the difference need to be in order to justify lethal control? If these competing interests were quantifiable, perhaps if the conservation interest were at least double that of the interests of the problem species, and so the harm of violating the interests of the problem species was made up for by the benefit of the conservation interest, then lethal control could be ethically justified. But these values are not quantifiable and are interests with very different qualities and so are difficult to compare. This does not mean that it is impossible to consider the imbalance between interests when making decisions about lethal control; this is a very important factor to consider and this difficultly means that very careful thought must be put into the weights given to both the interests of individuals of the problems species and the conservation interest.

 

Effectiveness of control measures

The level of certainty about the benefit to the conservation interest as a result of control measures is another vital factor in decisions about lethal control. It is important that the proposed measures have been thoroughly researched (this may in fact involve a lethal control trial, the ethics of which will be discussed in a future post) and that the level of certainty (highly unlikely to be 100%) that the required benefit will occur as a result is taken into account in the decision.

Alternative measures

Lethal control is considered by some to be a last resort and by others as the go-to solution. Either way, full investigation and consideration of alternative measures are sometimes not carried out. Non-lethal control measures exist which can be highly effective, ineffective, cheap, costly, understudied and/or dependent on the conditions of individual sites. Non-lethal methods must be fully considered and if a similarly effective non-lethal method can be carried out then best efforts should be made to use this method, as to use lethal control in this case would be to violate the interests of individuals of the problem species without sufficient justification. (This is the point in the decision-making process when funding considerations may become particularly influential.)

Method of control

The method of lethal control is another factor to be considered when making a decision about the use of lethal control in conservation. The main considerations are the potential of the problem species to experience pain, suffering and anxiety. The level of development of the nervous system of the problem species is an important factor for control measures with the potential to cause pain and suffering, for example using a toxic chemical which slowly kills an animal may be more justifiable when used on an animal with a very basic nervous system and limited capacity to feel pain (e.g. bivalves such as oysters or mussels) compared with animals which have a more developed nervous system (e.g. vertebrates). The additional ability of “higher” animals to feel anxiety and fear, for example when captured, contained or handled before control takes place, is also a factor for similar reasons. Efforts must be made to reduce such suffering and if some suffering is still likely to occur then this must be taken into account when making the decision about using a method of lethal control.

Conclusions

Lethal control is widely used in conservation and in many cases may be ethically justifiable, though the ethical implications are sometimes implicitly rather than explicitly explored. This may be due in part to a lack of time and resources, interest in or understanding of the ethical issues involved or not considering lethal control to be an ethical problem. The key issue is addressing the difference between the interests of individuals of the problem species and the conservation interest of the threatened species, habitat or ecosystem, followed by a decision on whether the difference between the costs and benefits justifies the use of lethal control. It is important to consider these issues to ensure that conservation is carried out in the most effective and ethical way.

Why save a species?

When justifying the conservation of species and biodiversity there are several key arguments frequently put forward. Maintaining functioning ecosystems, to ensure the provision of ecosystem services (i.e. ecosystem functions which benefit human such as removing CO₂ from the atmosphere), preventing the loss of species with potential medical benefits and aesthetic and spiritual concerns are the main reasons frequently given in scientific literature, conservation organisation media and government publications. A final reason is often given or alluded to – existence value, the idea that because a species does exist it should be allowed to continue to exist.  Does a species have a value which is not related to its benefit to humans (real or hypothetical) or interactions with other species? Many people certainly feel strongly that it is wrong to allow or cause the extinction of a species but when arguing the case alternative justifications for preventing species loss are heavily relied upon. The term “species” will be used to discuss this topic – however, the definition of a species and if this is the best level of diversity at which to conserve are debated topics.

Us and them

All of the main reasons, listed above, given for conserving species can be reduced to either those which are beneficial to humans in some way or those which concern the existence value of a species. Many of the arguments concern conserving diversity of life rather than the survival of individual species but all are ultimately underpinned by either one of these main ideas.

(Humans can be considered part of ecosystems and so perhaps the arguments cannot be divided in this way – but the extent to which humans are considered part of nature is a topic for another post!)

Conserve for human benefit

Conserving species in order to continue ensure the continued provision of ecosystem services is a reason to save species explicitly for human benefit. It does not actually support the conservation of all species, only those necessary for these services to continue plus several more species to make sure the ecosystem is robust enough to continue to provide the service despite some inevitable species losses.

Preventing extinctions to avoid the blunder of permanently losing a species with currently unknown medicinal properties is also clearly for the benefit of humans. Another human-orientated argument is conservation for aesthetic purposes, so that future generations can enjoy nature.

This does not detract from the use of these arguments to drive conservation effort; they are all important and valid points. In addition, human-based reasons may be the only arguments some will accept and the support of all kinds of people with different opinions is vital for successful conservation. But is there a greater moral reason to conserve?

Conserve for existence value?

Other arguments for saving species are more ambiguous in their motivations.

Defending conservation of species for spiritual reasons, although still orientated around human welfare, hints at a desire to care for nature as something beyond a mere resource for our use and benefit.

One of the strongest arguments for preventing extinctions is the (much debated and researched) idea that higher biodiversity results in a greater number of ecosystem functions – i.e. a more robust ecosystem which can cope with change. As with the ecosystem services argument, this reason is concerned with biodiversity rather than saving individual species. However, this argument can be split into the same two sides, human benefit and existence value. Conserving biodiversity in order to protect ecosystem functioning can be seen in one way as identical to the human benefitting ecosystem services argument. But on the other hand, “ecosystem functions” are distinct from “ecosystem services” for a reason – ecosystem services are defined as those ecosystem functions which are beneficial to humans. (Of course, the dividing line between the two is not as clear-cut as this as the complexity of ecology means it is not always obvious which functions are indirectly linked to those which we directly benefit from, but for the sake of argument we can treat them as separate motivations for conservation.)

So, to what end to we aim to protect the remaining ecosystem functions? Protecting biodiversity for the sake of robust ecosystem functioning means that more species can survive. If not humans, then the implication is that the beneficiaries of the ecosystem functioning argument are the species which could survive as a result. Here is the idea that the more species surviving, the better.

This leads to the question of existence value, the idea that because a species exists there is an ethical argument for its continued existence. Is this the case? Does anything affect this value? Does it matter if humans are the cause of the risk to a species’ survival?

The useless species

In order to illustrate the removal of all human-benefit reasons for conservation to leave only the question of existence value, an imaginary “useless species” can be used.

Imagine a species. As a species, it does no harm nor good to any other species (including humans). The ecosystem can carry on as before with or without it. This species does not deplete the numbers of any others and it not required to keep another’s population size under control. Nothing depends on it such that they could not survive as well on another species in its place. From a practical point of view, it does not matter to humans, other species, the ecosystem or the planet if this species lives or dies.

If this species is about to go extinct, is there an ethical reason to try to save it? Why? Imagine thousands and millions of these useless species – does this change anything?

Gut feelings

The origins of ethical values are complex and debated, but many if not most people feel that it is wrong to allow a species to go extinct, all other factors being equal, and feel so particularly strongly when humans have played a role in driving a species to a high-risk state. Why do we feel this way? Perhaps part of the explanation is a vague uneasiness about the finality of extinction – that it should be prevented in case a better reason is thought of after it is too late. Perhaps also because we feel that we are a part of the natural world and have a desire to protect it in a non-speciesist manner – most humans would not want our species to go extinct.

Gut instincts can be useful to help us understand why we feel an action is right or wrong but they are not an ethical argument. Is there a true ethical reason to save a species from extinction?

What is the existence value?

Existence value and the value of life

When debating the value of life, the experiences of the being and its ability to view itself as an entity with a past and future are considered, among other factors. Can these arguments be applied to a species? A species is not a conscious, pain- and pleasure-experiencing entity, the removal of which may result in a reduced level of enjoyment in the world. This may be true of the lives of individuals of sentient species but not of the species as a whole. Similarly, it is only genetics which drive the survival of species, but the fact that genetic material in a species is self-replicating is not a basis for ethical decisions about species. Genes around today are here because they evolved in a manner which caused them to survive; this does not mean that they have interests to consider. Individuals in a species may have a desire to survive but this is not true at the species level.

The way in which an extinction could result in a reduction of pleasure in the world is through its relationships with other species. One extinction is likely to have knock-on effects and could ultimately reduce the level of satisfaction and happiness of sentient beings by making survival tougher, for example through the loss of a key food source. This indicates that the value of a species is at least partly related to its role in supporting the happiness of sentient species – bringing us dangerously close to the anthropocentric arguments! However, this reasoning does not describe true existence value of a species, only additional considerations.

Taxanomic considerations

From an ethical, non-taxaist viewpoint it does not matter what kind of species is being considered, the question of an existence value remains the same. It feels different to consider the value of the useless animal than to consider the value of the useless bacteria, but this is due to the additional considerations related to the value of sentient lives and also our human-orientated aesthetic and spiritual feelings towards nature. Any existence value of a species is independent of these values.

Human destruction considerations

Extinctions happen. Species go extinct all the time in their millions and have done so since species evolved from the soup of the early Earth. In certain periods throughout the history of the planet there are mass extinction events when, for some reason or another, the extinction rate jumps significantly above the general base rate. We are currently experiencing a mass extinction event.

Does this change the existence value of a species? If a species does have a value then does it only extend to the end of the period it would have existed without the onslaught of recent human destruction? If this is the case then humans have a moral obligation to prevent the extinction of species which they have pushed to the edge of survival, because otherwise we are preventing the continued existence of a self-replicating species which has a right to continue to survive.

(NB The status of human actions as distinct from natural causes of mass extinction events, such as ice ages and meteors, is debateable!)

Pure existence value?

The above argument only suggests that if a species is assumed to have an existence value then we ought to prevent its extinction if we would be its cause. What is the essence of the existence value of a species? A species is a set of living beings which reproduce to create similar beings capable of further reproduction. Species around today have survived through many different forms and only exist in a transient state, constantly evolving. In this way a species is difficult to pin down as an entity which might have a right to survive. It is difficult also to consider the question of its continued existence without thinking of humans, the likely cause of its extinction.

Does a species as it exists at a given time have a right to survive? This right must be limited to the difficult to define or determine “natural lifespan” of the species as otherwise there would be a moral obligation to prevent any species extinction, including those which would have occurred anyway, and the world would be overrun with immortal species. Perhaps it has a right to continue to exist simply because it has done so, but why? Here is where this train of thought ultimately leads and so this discussion is not over – I would really welcome any opinions on this topic!

The Cow in the Room

There is a lot of public encouragement to live a more environmentally friendly lifestyle. Recycle your rubbish, switch the lights off, take the train to work, buy local produce and take it home in your reusable bag. So far so good. But there is a glaring omission from the familiar eco-friendly public discourse – the number one source of global greenhouse gas emissions, 40% more than the contribution of global transport – animal agriculture. I am not going to go anymore into the statistics here, but it does not take much Googling to find out just how bad animal agriculture is for the environment. It is true that eating less meat and dairy does come up in some discussions about environmentally conscious living but this is generally among those who are already supportive of the environmental agenda. Still, many people who consider themselves environmentalists eat a large amount of meat and dairy, in line with that of the general population. Are they hypocritical, ignorant or misinformed? On the other hand, some forms of animal agriculture make a good effort to minimise their harmful effects and there are other environmental issues associated with food such as pesticide use and distance travelled. But it is clear that reducing consumption of meat and dairy products has massive potential to reduce our impact on the environment – so why is it not the first thing people think of when they consider leading a more environmentally-friendly life?

Vegetarian agenda?

The issue of reducing meat and dairy consumption is unsurprisingly linked with vegetarianism and veganism in people’s minds – reducing environmental impact is a key motivation behind meat and dairy-free diets alongside animal welfare and animal rights factors. This can put off those who are simply trying to prevent harm to the planet as they may feel as if they will become be associated with a passionate group with morals may not hold themselves and be forced to defend their position to potentially hostile peers whenever publicly choosing a meat-free option. The food we eat is a visible aspect of our choices. There is also a feeling that anyone who avoids meat and dairy and encourages others to do the same is a hippy activist with a vegetarian agenda which can discourage open discussion of this issue.

In reality, many kinds of people avoid meat and dairy partially or completely for all kinds of reasons. To help the idea of reducing meat and dairy consumption for environmental benefit become a topic people feel they can talk about among a wider range of people with widely contrasting opinions and backgrounds the motivations for this change in diet must be untangled. Helping people understand that they can eat less meat and dairy with purely environmental motivations and without taking on a vegetarian stereotype is a good first step. Many groups already do this, but more mainstream discussion is needed. This is not to detract from promoting the compelling animal welfare and animal rights reasons for avoiding animal products, but can give a non-veggie social option to help encourage more people to avoid these foods who are currently closed to these reasons.

“We’ll buy our way out of this mess!”*

Without financial motivation it is difficult to gain large-scale backing for a particular environmentally-friendly lifestyle choice. We can buy low-energy lightbulbs, reusable bags, train tickets and CFC-free fridges. Even recycling has its own economy going on, buying and selling recyclable material and promoting recycled products – there is money to be made. But there is not such a clear financial beneficiary to consumers buying less meat and dairy. Alpro? Cauldron? (The only tofu producer to grace the supermarket shelves, in my experience.) Soya growers? Unlikely, since the vast majority of the unsustainable global soya crop goes to feeding animals for human consumption, so they would be going down with the ranchers.

The environmental impact of animal product consumption is also less well understood by the general public. Cars pollute and give out greenhouse gases, we call all see it right in front of us. But we don’t see what comes from the infamously secretive animal agriculture industry. They don’t want us to know how much they are costing is all in real terms us all because they are cashing in.

Our economies are tied up with the animal agriculture industry. The idea behind eating less meat and dairy to reduce environmental impact is explicitly to decrease the size of the industry – who is going to give large-scale funding to this campaign? As with general climate change campaigns, the beneficiaries are the planet and humans of the future and so in the short-term it is altruistic campaigning which is needed. The organisations and systems for this already exist, but reducing animal agriculture needs to be more incorporated in large-scale mainstream environmental campaigns to provide the public understanding and support to make this happen.

Tradition and wealth

People are reluctant to believe that the animal agriculture industry has changed and the industry is keen to keep it this way. It is in different stages around the world but the trend towards mass-production of animal products is clear. Yet we still seem to believe in the myth (in most cases) that all our meat and dairy came from quaint, old-fashioned farms. Even those which maintain more traditional methods are serious greenhouse gas contributors, it is only the scale which varies. The secrecy of the industry and their aggressive advertising are key here, along with our own nostalgia – we would like to believe that the meat we buy is fine but we are kidding ourselves.

Meat eating is associated with wealth – in the past meat was for the wealthy or on special occasions. Now everyone wants a piece, in line with a general trend towards living outside one’s means. This demand for super-cheap food is a large part of the problem as it drives the change towards mass-produced animal products. Increased public understanding and a general attitude shift regarding meat and dairy consumption are needed.

The new meat

Another reason for the reluctance to include consuming fewer animal products among environmentally-friendly lifestyle choices may be the perception that eating meat is nothing new. Cars, planes and mass-consumption are seen as new inventions which were not around to cause problems in the past and this is why they are causing problems now. People have always eaten meat and dairy, so how could it be to blame for climate change? But modern animal product production and consumption is new – including the methods used in animal agriculture, the amount of meat and dairy each of us eat and the number of humans in the planet consuming these products. This distinction needs to be made clear – current animal agriculture and consumption is a modern danger and needs to be tackled along with the other key players in climate change. Perhaps, as the top greenhouse gas contributor, even more so.

Too much change?

It may be that eating less meat and dairy seems too daunting a task for some. In contrast to taking the train, using a low-energy lightbulb, buying local, reusing bags and recycling, making a fundamental change to one’s diet can seem a challenge. There is a general lack of knowledge about meat and dairy-free food – I am often met with confused looks and “what do you eat then?” It is not difficult to see why, when the options available at restaurants, cafes, take-aways, roadside shops and as ready-meals are so reliant on animal products as key ingredients. Take away the meat and dairy and you are left with rice, pasta or potatoes, maybe a sauce and some vegetables if you’re lucky. This is also often true of people’s home-cooked food. When the suggestion is made to eat less meat and dairy it seems impossible. The response to this problem is very clear – more and better meat and dairy-free menu options at restaurants, better availability of suitable ingredients and more discussion of suitable recipes on cookery shows.

This still leaves the hurdle of people’s lack of acceptance of a low-meat and low-dairy diet. Perhaps environmental campaign groups are daunted by the prospect of advocating such a fundamental lifestyle change and prefer to focus their efforts on more realistic objectives. It feels very accusatory to say that something as intimate as the food another person eats is wrong. But the more it is discussed the more acceptable and understood it becomes. Environmentally-friendly actions which were seen as radical in the past are mainstream now. The same can be said in virtually all campaigning areas – the initial resistance of attitude can seem impossible to overcome and not worth of effort but time has shown that humankind has been vastly improved by such efforts. This is what needs to happen now, on a large scale, for animal agriculture.

Talk about it!

More open discussion about the harm done by animal agriculture and how we can make a massive change by altering our diet will go a long way to helping move this lifestyle change into the public sphere. I am only discussing animal agriculture in general terms here – there are eco-friendly animal farming options but these are so comparatively small that they cannot justify continuing to eat meat and dairy on the scale we do. Public opinion is influenced greatly by information given by the government, schools and charities – the more this issue is talked about the more likely this information will be incorporated into public discourse. We need to discuss the idea of eating less meat and dairy to benefit the environment so that it moves out of the “radical” stage and becomes firmly included as an essential aspect of an environmentally-friendly life.

*[The heading of this section is a quote from a poem by Danny Chivers, an environmental activist and poet, entitled “Don’t Buy It” about the contradiction of buying more and more eco-branded products. I saw him performing at a poetry slam in St Andrews – he was brilliant and funny and very effective at getting his message across. http://dannychivers.blogspot.co.uk/ ]

Nature and morality: Part I - Behaviour

To what extent should humans strive to emulate the rest of the natural world? We hear arguments in many areas of life, from reproduction to race to food, which advocate a particular act or system because it is “natural” and condemn others for being “unnatural”. The assumption is that if something occurs in nature then it is right. But does the selfish and violent world to which we refer really reflect human morality? If not then why do we continue to strive for this strange ideal? This post covers aspects of natural and human behaviour and how this relates to human morality. A future post will cover food, conservation and resource use.

Why do we aim for nature?

The natural ideal may be seen as the perfect system to aim for due to the perception that everything in nature has its place and is in balanced harmony, never exploiting resources as we unnatural humans do. Humans are seen to be disrupting this balance by our unprecedented industrial development and to rectify this destructive pattern we must return to systems of living found in nature. Regarding social relations, the behaviour of non-human animals may be thought of as being straightforward and rational with no malicious intent compared to our human behaviour often ruled by seemingly irrational and spiteful emotions. However, neither idea stands up to the realities of basic biology, let alone human morals.

Nature is not balanced, it is in a constant dynamic state of fluctuation. Ecosystems have evolved together with species and individuals always evolving in ways which give them the upper hand, resulting in closely linked relationships. It is this close-linked evolution which appears to result in a perfect balance. This is not the case – non-human species would, and do, exploit resources if the opportunity arose. It does not matter if they are parasitic, predator-prey or mutualistic (in which both species involved receive some benefit from the interaction) – each species is in it for themselves and are evolving in ways which increase their reproductive output. Communities which appear to fluctuate about a point and return to this apparent equilibrium may do so over the timescale in which we can study them. But even if undisturbed by outside factors the system will always change eventually as species continue to evolve.  Along the same lines, the social behaviour of non-human animals is not based on simple-minded and well-meaning goals but the constant evolutionary pressure to survive.

Morals in nature?

Many common and natural animal behaviours are analogous to human behaviours which most would agree are abhorrent. But these along with natural behaviours which appear to represent ideal moral positions to our human minds are in fact simply evolutionarily favourable.

Practices which are widely accepted as morally unacceptable or subject to moral debate in human society are often found in nature. Behaviours including rape, infanticide, deceit, abortion, fratricide, theft and murder are all widespread in nature. These are not freak examples, these behaviours are common and part of the lifecycle and society of many species. One does not have to look far to find examples of primates killing the young of females impregnated before they were on the scene to avoid wasting resources on another male’s offspring or chicks pushing their siblings from the nest to gain more food for themselves.

On the other hand, does nature’s better side redeem it? Animal behaviours may also seem similar to good moral behaviour in humans. A key example of this is altruism, a behavioural phenomenon much studied and debated in the last century. Altruism is when an animal behaves in a selfless manner. Many animal behaviours appear to be altruistic, such as bees giving up their lives for their colony. But true altruism does not exist in nature – behaviour appearing to be altruistic is really selfish behaviour from an evolutionary perspective. Delving into the genetics involved in seemingly altruistic behaviours in the natural world invariably shows us that the ultimate outcome is optimal spread and continuation of a particular set of genes.

Nature’s morals seem ambiguous at best and evil at worst. Following nature does not appear to make sense when striving for a morally sound life and society. Both these seemingly immoral and moral behaviours are rooted not in the morality of the species concerned but simply in evolution – their outcome is to increase the reproductive output of the animal, no more, no less.

Human morals

Human morals are not completely removed from nature; being part of nature ourselves complicates the argument for aiming for a more natural lifestyle.

The argument could be made that as humans are but animals then there is no real distinction between natural behaviour and our own behaviour, making the aiming for a natural life idea pointless as we are there already.

Even if this argument is disregarded, many human instincts which are commonly thought of as good or bad morals are muddled up with our evolutionary past. The basis for moral behaviours such as heroically risking one’s life for another in danger may be partially rooted in the evolutionarily beneficial goal of increasing the likelihood that this act will be returned in the future or even to increase one’s attractiveness to potential mates. The same can be said for immoral behaviours such as rape, which may be partially driven by the evolutionarily advantageous desire to increase reproductive output.

It seems as if humans pick and choose which of our natural behaviours we accept as natural and right or unnatural and wrong. Nature is used as an acceptable argument for moral behaviour but not for behaviour we have decided is immoral – it is used only to explain but not truly justify our deep dark “immoral” desires. In this way, the nature-is-right idea also breaks down. This could be because human morality is distinct from these reproductive output-increasing behaviours - it is simply the case that sometimes they overlap when animal behaviours are anthropomorphised and look like moral behaviour. However, morality is hard to distinguish from these instincts as it is not easy to determine exactly why we believe something to be morally right, but this does not justify using nature as an argument for or against some behaviours and not others.

Should we accept the argument that what is natural is morally right?

Very often the reasons for aiming for nature are misinformed and a basic understanding of the natural world indicates that nature is not so morally right after all. In any case, this point is irrelevant as both seemingly moral and immoral behaviours in nature are rooted solely in evolutionary survival. In addition, human morality and natural behaviour (though they may be muddled together somewhat by evolution) they are distinct from one another and should not be treated as analogous.